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It is sometimes argued that political competition yields benefits to the citizens just as 
competition in economic markets yields benefits to consumers.  We consider the economic costs 
and benefits of political competition and find that the story is somewhat more complicated.  We 
first review the limited existing literature on this topic, and in the process, identify a number of 
distinct interpretations of what constitutes political competition.  We then turn our attention to 
two forms of political competition based on what we refer to as accountability for incumbents 
and electoral politics.  We find that, while political competition can yield allocative benefits for 
the public, it can also generate aggregate welfare costs by constricting the set of politically 
feasible public investments. 
__________________________ 
This paper is available on-line at the new California Digital Library/ eScholarship site:  
http://repositories.cdlib.org/iber/econ/ and at the original Economics Department Publication site:  
http://iber.berkeley.edu/Wps/econwp.html  
 2 
I.  Introduction and Overview of Existing Literature 
 
Democracy, particularly with its foundation in liberal values, is widely acclaimed. 
Even in its narrower sense of giving scope for political competition, it is supposed to be 
welfare-enhancing for the citizens.  The analogy from economic markets is often applied 
to political markets. Political scientists have, of course, long pointed to the complexities 
in the effects of democracy, both in aggregation of individual preferences and in 
accomplishing efficient outcomes in political markets. The theoretical literature on the 
economic costs and benefits of political competition is somewhat more limited. This 
paper is a contribution to the latter literature. Our emphasis is largely on intuitive 
explanations of some of the broad features of economic costs and benefits of political 
competition in terms of extremely simple models, and not on intricacies of particular 
types of voting behavior and party strategy or the multi-dimensionality of the policy 
space.
1  
  The term "political competition" has been used in different studies to describe 
different things. One interpretation of political competition, which we shall refer to as 
accountability for incumbents, focuses on the process of political turnover.  According to 
this interpretation, political competition is more intense when the public can more easily 
remove incumbent leaders and replace them with challengers.  Note that this view of 
political competition is inter-temporal in nature: political competition affects the behavior 
of incumbent leaders today via tomorrow's threat of dismissal. 
                                                 
1  Those interested in the latter should consult Persson and Tabellini (2000) and Roemer (2001). 3 
Some of the potential benefits of this first form of political competition are 
straightforward: to the extent that incumbent rulers have a personal interest in 
maintaining power, their incentives to respond to the public's wishes are stronger when 
the public can more easily strip them of their power.  Simply put, the public holds more 
bargaining power when it holds a tighter leash on incumbents.  This first interpretation of 
political competition might therefore be the one most easily associated with the concept 
of political "accountability."  In other words, increased political competition of this first 
sort increases the ease with which the public can hold incumbent rulers accountable for 
their actions in office.         
However, as the existing literature has noted, the public's ability to threaten 
incumbent rulers with dismissal can also backfire if the threat of dismissal becomes too 
strong.  This risk of backfire can emerge wherever elections take place at discreet 
intervals (as in most real world settings).  The problem arises out of the fact that the 
behavior of an incumbent ruler between elections can be disciplined by his desire to gain 
re-election, but only to the extent that he views re-election as a realistic possibility.  As a 
result, when political competition based on political turnover makes re-election 
sufficiently unlikely, an incumbent may purposefully abandon any lingering hopes of re-
election in order to extract the maximum rents possible during his remaining time in 
office.  Thus a too strong threat of future dismissal may induce a wholesale shift in 
political incentives towards the short term.  It is the public's need to dissuade incumbents 
from engaging in massive looting that lends incumbents what Persson, Roland, and 
Tabellini (1997) term "power between elections."  In particular, the public may need to 4 
tolerate  some graft by legislators, even if it is within their powers to punish it with 
dismissal from office, in order to stave off wholesale graft.  
  In a recent series of papers, Acemoglu and Robinson (2000 and 2002) have 
attributed another potential cost to political competition based on political turnover.
2 
Acemoglu and Robinson focus on incumbent rulers' incentives to undertake public 
investments.  In their models, public investments
3 are economically productive but 
politically destabilizing, meaning that an incumbent ruler must balance his incentive to 
expand his tax base (through investment) against his incentive to keep his position secure 
(through non-investment).  In settings marked by low levels of political competition, the 
latter consideration plays a small role: the incumbent faces little risk of losing power in 
any case, and is therefore emboldened to undertake investments that grow his empire.  
However, when political competition is more intense, the destabilizing effects of public 
investment weigh more heavily on the incumbent, leading in many cases to a non-
investment outcome. 
  The Acemoglu-Robinson framework involves an assumption linking investment 
by an incumbent to an exogenous reduction in the entry costs that his challengers face.  
                                                 
2 In a recent paper, de Figueiredo (2002) advances a novel argument concerning the potential benefits of 
political turnover.  In his model, two competing parties have differing preferences for policy.  In each 
period of an infinitely repeated game, one party takes office with probability α while the other takes office 
with probability 1 – α, where α is determined exogenously.  When in power, a party has the power to 
introduce its preferred policy, as well as to revoke the preferred policy of its opponent.  Alternatively, the 
two parties can choose to "cooperate" by leaving both policies intact regardless of the party in power.  de 
Figueiredo demonstrates that such norms of cooperation, if they are to be enforced by trigger strategies, 
become more easily sustained as α approaches 0.5.  Intuitively, the threat of punishment by trigger 
strategies poses a more powerful deterrent to opportunistic behavior when a party (the threatened party) 
recognizes that its opponent is more likely to be in a position to deliver on the threat; symmetrically, a 
party can more credibly threaten its opponent for defection from the cooperative norm when it (the 
threatening party) has a greater likelihood of attaining power. 
 
3 We use the term "public investment" loosely here.  In Acemoglu and Robinson (2000), for example, the 
incumbent's prospective "investment" involves granting entry to an agent with superior technology. 5 
In this sense, the politically destabilizing effects of public investment are assumed rather 
than derived.  In the next section, we derive a result in the spirit of Acemoglu-Robinson 
but using a simple model in which the politically destabilizing effects of public 
investment arise endogenously.  In our model in section II, there exists asymmetric 
information between an incumbent ruler and the public about the cost of a prospective 
public investment—the ruler observes the cost while the public does not.  As a result, 
when public investment is undertaken but accompanied by high levels of government 
spending, the public grows suspicious that the incumbent ruler has lined his own pockets 
rather than faced high actual investment costs.  In settings marked by high levels of 
political competition (in particular, where the public must incur only a small cost in order 
to dismiss the incumbent), the public is quick to act on these suspicions and punish the 
incumbent for good measure.  Anticipating this, the incumbent ruler is cowed into 
inaction when the actual cost of public investment is high (even though it may still be 
small in relation to the benefit). 
Echoing Acemoglu and Robinson, we emphasize the theme that political 
competition—based on the threat of political turnover—can introduce a tradeoff between 
benefits related to allocative considerations and costs related to aggregate welfare 
considerations.  In our model, the allocative benefits arise from the fact that increased 
political competition disciplines an incumbent from claiming too much of the economic 
pie for himself.  Specifically, increased political competition forces an incumbent to limit 
government spending whenever public investment is undertaken, so that when investment 
does take place, a larger share of aggregate surplus accrues to the public.  However, 
because an incumbent who faces a high risk of public sanction will only undertake a 6 
public investment when it is possible to do so and still keep government spending down, 
public investment is less likely to take place, and this lowers the expected level of 
aggregate surplus. 
  Let us turn now to a second interpretation of political competition, which focuses 
less on the process of political turnover and more on the extent to which political 
authority is decentralized.  (We do not pursue this interpretation in this paper, as there 
exists a fairly large literature on it).  According to this interpretation, political 
competition is more intense when political authority is in the hands of a larger number of 
agents at any given point in time.  Thus, this is a view of political competition that can be 
more easily reconciled in a static setting, as with static models of Cournot or Bertrand 
competition between firms.  
The potential benefits of this second form of political competition are indeed 
largely akin to the potential benefits of competition between firms in a market for goods 
or services: in this case, political decentralization creates competition on the supply side 
of a "market for governance," generating equilibrium outcomes that favor the demand 
side of that market, or the public at large.  As the literature on federalism has forcefully 
argued, competition between authorities representing distinct political jurisdictions 
creates opportunities for authorities representing "efficient" political jurisdictions (e.g., 
those exhibiting limited corruption and sound economic policy) to attract mobile 
resources away from authorities representing inefficient jurisdictions, which induces 
authorities in each jurisdiction to become more politically efficient (for a recent overview 
of this literature, see the Symposium on Fiscal Federalism in the Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, Fall 1997).  7 
  But as is the case with competition between firms, competition between political 
authorities can generate economic costs whenever externalities are present.  A prominent 
theoretical framework that has been used to illustrate this point is the common pool 
model of fiscal policy.  In this type of model, decentralization of political authority places 
public spending decisions in the hands of fiscal authorities who compare the marginal 
benefits of public spending against only a fraction of the social marginal costs—the 
reason is that the benefits of public spending are concentrated (e.g., within a particular 
jurisdiction, or a particular interest group), while the costs are spread out across the 
whole of society.  This leads, in equilibrium, to a particular version of the tragedy of the 
commons, where the tragedy in this case takes the form of a depleted pool of public 
saving (see Persson and Tabellini (2000), Drazen (2000), and references therein).
4   
Inter-jurisdictional competition to attract mobile resources may also be prone to 
unique frictions that render the pure "market for policy" view incomplete.  As Rodden 
and Rose-Ackerman (1997) argue, for example, local officials may often face electoral 
incentives to ignore the threats of the mobile and instead make pacts with coalitions of 
less mobile constituents.  In instances where the political clout of the immobile reflects 
their tighter collusion rather than their greater numbers—as is often the case with 
oligarchic landed interests, for example—the distortionary effects may be quite severe. 
                                                 
4 A prominent set of issues, addressed by dynamic models of the common pool problem, concerns the 
existence of multiple equilibria and the possibility of path-dependency.  In the model of Mondino, 
Sturzenegger, and Tommasi (1998), for example, sustainable consumption (via norms of cooperation) is 
only triggered when the common pool of resources has become sufficiently depleted, creating a situation in 
which the economy is destined to recurrent inflation-stabilization cycles.  In contrast, Aizenmann (1998) 
provides a model in which sustainable consumption is more easily achieved in settings characterized by 
high levels of initial wealth—creating the potential for stable and path-dependent equilibria.    8 
For a model of the trade-off between local informational advantages of decentralization 
and the possibility of capture by local elite, see Bardhan and Mookherjee (forthcoming).
5 
Besley and Case (1995) also consider the potential costs and benefits associated 
with inter-jurisdictional competition, but depart from the federalism literature's focus on 
competition to attract mobile resources.  They consider a multi-jurisdictional model with 
heterogeneous elected officials.  In their model, agents are immobile, but can deduce 
information about their local officials' "types" by observing the behavior of officials in 
neighboring jurisdictions.  This leads to a situation in which local officials engage in 
"yardstick competition," whereby each recognizes that his performance will be judged in 
relation to the performance of others.  This form of competition can yield benefits to the 
people by providing predatory officials with an incentive to "hide their true colors" (in 
Besley and Case, they do this by exercising restraint in taxation).  However, in situations 
where this charade is anticipated to prove too costly, predatory officials may choose to 
abandon their hopes of reelection in order to grab all that they can from the public at 
once—in this sense, the potential costs of yardstick competition are akin to the potential 
costs of ignoring incumbents' "power between elections," described earlier.   
                                                 
5 The literature on corruption has yielded an example of how decentralization of authority can also bring 
the tradeoff between allocative benefits and aggregate welfare costs that we earlier linked to political 
competition based on political turnover.  However, the mechanism generating the tradeoff in this context is 
entirely different.  Rasmusen and Ramsayer (1994) consider a setting in which decentralization of authority 
over the granting of private interest statutes reduces the bribes that self-interested legislators can secure in 
return for granting the statutes (an allocative benefit), but also causes the statutes to be granted too 
permissively (an aggregate welfare cost).  In their model, decentralization sets the stage for a coordination 
failure between the legislators, where each legislator's dominant strategy is to grant any statute in exchange 
for any nonzero bribe, even when doing so generates much larger social costs.  Intuitively, each legislator 
fears that if he does not accept the bribe (however small), another legislator will do so and he will be left 
with nothing.  This stands in contrast to the autocratic setting, where a single ruler would appropriate all of 
the social value of statutes granted but also internalize the full social costs, leading to efficient choices 
from an aggregate welfare standpoint.   
 9 
  A third interpretation of political competition, which we later refer to as electoral 
politics, focuses on conflict between parties and elites to win public support.  This 
interpretation of political competition is certainly related to both the first and second 
interpretations of political competition—which associate political competition with, 
respectively, opportunities for political turnover, and decentralization of political 
authority.  As an example, consider the approach used by Skilling and Zeckhauser (2002) 
to measure the intensity of this third form of political competition.  They construct a 
"political competition index" equal to one minus a Herfindahl index for the major 
political parties in a country, the latter being just a market concentration index applied to 
party politics.  But to measure political concentration, they base their political "market 
share" measures on the proportion of time that a party was in power between 1960 and 
1997—which is clearly related to the first interpretation of political competition based on 
political turnover.     
For the sake of drawing a working distinction between the three forms of political 
competition that we have so far introduced, let us think of electoral politics as 
competition between essentially identical agents to acquire political power, rather than 
competition between those already in power and those who wish to attain power (the 
"accountability for incumbents" interpretation), or competition between those already in 
power (the "decentralization of authority" interpretation).  In addition, we may note that 
the first two forms of political competition can exist even in the absence of well-defined 
parties or elites, while the third form focuses on their particular interaction. 
Our focus in section III is on this third form, on electoral politics and its role in 
determining the political feasibility of long-term investments.  Our discussion is partly 10 
motivated by the common, but seldom formalized, perception that competition between 
parties and elites can often lead to what has been termed competitive populism, involving 
the use of money-power to seek short term political advantage at the expense of decisive 
political actions benefiting the long term.
6 We discuss the sustainability of long-term 
investments in the shadow of electoral politics. Again using a very simple modeling 
approach, we formalize two stories in which electoral politics can act to preclude long 
term investments whose time horizons of uncertainty extend across elections—in other 
words, investments that are sufficiently long-term such that there exists at least one 
election between the date of investment and the date of maturity.  Here, we draw from the 
theoretical literature on the economics of reform, including Fernandez and Rodrik 
(1991), which has addressed obstacles to long-term investment (of which reforms 
constitute one example) based on time-inconsistency of preferences.  The question we 
address is: why might certain long-term investments be rendered politically infeasible by 
electoral politics even when political parties have the power to make binding 
commitments to policy? 
                                                 
6 To our knowledge, competitive populism has not been formally modeled as such.  However, the model of 
Dixit and Londregan (1995) comes closest.  Dixit and Londregan consider a setting in which agents at 
large are ex ante identical, but where agents from one particular sector of the economy have an opportunity 
to change sectors in order to achieve productivity gains.  To relocate, these agents must incur upfront 
moving costs that will be more than offset by their post-relocation productivity gains—thus, in the absence 
of political distortions, they would make the efficient decision to relocate.  However, the decision to 
relocate or not must be made before two competing political parties announce their policy platforms.  
When the agents choose to relocate, each party's dominant strategy at the margin is to redistribute wealth 
away from the relocated agents and towards other agents whose votes are up for grabs, until the ex post 
distribution of wealth is again uniform across all agents at large.  Anticipating that they will therefore be 
unable to recoup their upfront moving costs, the agents facing the opportunity to relocate choose rationally 
to pass on the opportunity. 
 
 11 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II examines some of the 
costs and benefits of political competition in the sense of accountability for incumbents. 
Section III does the same for political competition as electoral politics; subsection A 
showing the problems associated with long-term investments that hinge on redistributive 
schemes between the gainers and losers, illustrated with the political economy of 
protectionism, and subsection B showing a case where even investments that meet the 
approval of an ex ante majority can still be politically infeasible.  Section IV concludes.  
   
II.  Accountability for Incumbents and Public Investment 
 
As we noted in the previous section, increased accountability for incumbents 
would appear to carry at least one unambiguous benefit for constituent welfare: to the 
extent that incumbent rulers have a personal interest in maintaining power, their 
incentives to respond to the public's wishes are stronger when the public can more easily 
strip them of their power.       
As a starting point, let us consider a simple example in which the public's ability 
to hold an incumbent leader accountable carries only this unambiguous consequence.  
Consider an economy with two agents: an incumbent ruler, and a representative 
constituent (henceforth, "the public").  The economy enters each period of an infinitely 
repeated game with a fixed and perishable wealth endowment of size 1.  The incumbent 
has autocratic control rights over this pool of public wealth, and is free to choose how 
much of it to consume for himself versus how much of it to leave for the public's 
consumption; we let xt denote the incumbent's consumption of public wealth in period t, 12 
where xt ≤ 1.  Assume that the utilities of both the incumbent and the public are strictly 
increasing in consumption. 
  Now, suppose that the public has the following accountability mechanism at its 
disposal: by incurring a cost equal to γ, it can dispose of the incumbent at period's end 
and reclaim the public funds xt that the incumbent has channeled away for himself.  If the 
incumbent is removed from office, his payoff from the period is zero, and he is replaced 
by an identical ruler in the following period.  We may therefore think of the parameter γ 
as a measure of the ruler's accountability to the public.  
  It is plain to see that the equilibrium of this simple game involves the incumbent 
ruler consuming xt = γ and the public consuming 1 – γ in every period; the incumbent is 
retained indefinitely, but his consumption is exactly bounded by the public's cost of 
holding him accountable for overindulging on public funds.  The parameter γ only affects 
allocative outcomes in equilibrium: when the public can more easily hold the incumbent 
accountable (when γ is smaller), it retains a larger share of the economy's rents. 
  Although this example is provided as the simplest possible starting point for the 
discussion below, two assumptions must be addressed.  First, by assuming that the public 
can reclaim xt whenever it chooses to replace an incumbent, we are implicitly assuming 
that expropriated assets are fungible.  In the process, we are ruling out scenarios in which 
an incumbent "goes for broke" by robbing the entirety of the economy's wealth in a given 
period in anticipation of fleeing his post (e.g., by channeling most or all of the public 
treasury to offshore accounts and then seeking foreign asylum).  If we were to allow for 
this possibility, it can be easily shown that the incumbent's per period utility would be 
bounded from above by not just the parameter γ, but by the maximum of γ and 1 – β, 13 
where β is the incumbent's intertemporal discount factor.
7  This consideration does not 
add to our present discussion, so we have chosen to abstract from it.   
  Second, in order to draw a stark contrast between the allocative effects of the 
parameter  γ and the efficiency effects described next—when public investment is 
introduced—we have assumed that there are no deadweight losses from consumption by 
the state.  Relaxing this assumption would of course lend an efficiency-enhancing effect 
to reductions in the size of the parameter γ.  We ignore this mechanism in order to bring 
the allocation-efficiency tradeoff into starker contrast.               
 
Public Investment and Information Asymmetry 
 
  Now suppose that, in addition to choosing how to allocate each period's 
endowment of public funds between himself and the public, the incumbent must also 
choose whether or not to undertake an investment that yields a benefit to the public.  The 
prospective return on this investment is public knowledge, but its cost is only known to 
the incumbent.  In particular, suppose that investment yields the public a certain utility 
gain of G, but carries a stochastic cost gt, where gt is assumed to be uniformly distributed 
over the interval  ] , [ H L g g . 
  The timing of the stage game is as follows: 
 
                                                 
7 The incumbent must be allowed to consume at least 1 - β if he is to be discouraged from fleeing his post 
with the maximum one-time payoff. 14 
1)  The ruler observes the true value of gt, and chooses whether or not to undertake the 
public investment.  He then chooses how to allocate the economy's remaining wealth 
between himself and a refund to the public.   
2)  The public observes whether or not investment has taken place, as well as the size of 
its refund, but not the actual cost of investment (and therefore not the ruler's actual 
consumption if investment has taken place). 
3)  The public chooses whether or not to retain the ruler.  
 
Continuing to let xt denote the ruler's gross public expenditures (including possible 
investment costs), the utility of the ruler is now given by 
 
           V  =    xt – gt    if investment has taken place   
    xt   if not,  (1)
 
whereas the utility of the public is given by  
 
          U  =    1 + G – xt   if investment has taken place   
    1– xt   if not  (2)
 
If the public chooses to remove the incumbent at time 3, it learns the true cost gt of the 
public investment, and is in addition able to reclaim any amount that the incumbent ruler 




  The key addition that we have now introduced to the baseline example is not the 
public investment opportunity per se, but rather the asymmetric information that 
surrounds the cost of the investment.  Suppose that there was no information asymmetry, 
and that the cost of the investment was public knowledge.  In this case, it is clear that the 
public would replace the ruler if and only if xt ≥ g + γ.  In addition, the cost parameter g 
would have no efficiency implications: the incumbent would be always willing to 
undertake efficient investments, as his private payoff would be independent of g.         
To see the implications of information asymmetry surrounding gt on both the 
equilibrium distribution of rents and the incumbent's incentives to undertake public 
investment, let us start at the end of the stage game, when the public must choose 
whether or not to remove the incumbent.  Note that the presence of information 
asymmetry is relevant to the equilibrium if and only if public investment takes place—
when there is no public investment, the public is able to deduce the exact consumption of 
the ruler.  Suppose that investment has taken place.   
In equilibrium, the public will choose to remove the incumbent if and only if the 
public's refund falls below some threshold level.  At the same time, the ruler will choose 
to undertake the public investment if and only if the cost of investment gt falls below 
some threshold level g* < G, where g* is the endogenously-determined maximum level 
of gt under which the ruler can offer the public a large enough refund to keep his job 
while still remaining at least as well off as he would be in the absence of investment.  The 
ruler's payoff in the presence of investment is therefore equal to  16 
 
V  =  g* – gt,   (3)
 
while the public's payoff is equal to  
 
U  =  1 + G – g*. (4)
 
From equations (3) and (4), we see that the ruler always "implicitly reports" an 
investment cost of gt = g* by offering a refund of 1 – g* to the public.  This is intuitive, 
since the incumbent has no incentive to offer the public a larger post-investment refund 
than is necessary to avoid sanction, and by definition, costs larger than g* make 
investment irrational for the ruler. 
  Turning to the public's decision to remove or retain the incumbent, the public 
recognizes at time 3 that the incumbent will have chosen to invest at time 1 if and only if 
gt lies below g*.  It will therefore choose to remove the incumbent if and only if  
 
E[(g* – gt) | gt  ≤  g*]    ≥    γ,  (5)
 
where the LHS of equation (5) is the public's expected payoff from sanctioning the 
incumbent (the expected difference between the purported cost of the public investment 
and the actual cost, conditional on the latter being smaller than the former).  Given our 
assumptions about the distribution of gt, the level of g* that leaves the public indifferent 
between removing and retaining the incumbent is  17 
 
g*  =  2γ + gL.  (6)
 
Inserting equation (6) into equation (3) and (4), we see that reductions in the public's cost 
of sanctioning an incumbent (decreases in γ) cause a shift in post-investment rents away 
from the incumbent and towards the public, resulting from decreases in g*.  However, 
because an incumbent will choose to undertake public investment if and only if gt ≤ g*, 
the public's ability to keep a tighter rein on the incumbent also decreases the likelihood of 
the public investment being undertaken in the first place.   
The intuition behind the investment-stifling effects of increased accountability for 
incumbents is straightforward.  When the public can sanction incumbents at a low cost, it 
is quick to act on suspicions of fiscal misconduct.  Anticipating this, incumbents choose 
rationally to pass up high cost investment opportunities (even if the cost is still small in 
relation to the benefit) in order to avoid raising those suspicions of fiscal misconduct.  In 
essence, an incumbent who knows that he can be sanctioned on a whim is cowed into 
inaction.   
Note that the incumbent's incentives for investment depend only on the 
characteristics of the cost distribution (in particular, the lower bound of the distribution 
gL) and the public's cost of sanction γ, and are therefore independent of the benefit from 
investment G.  It is for this reason that the public's ability to sanction incumbent leaders 
at a low cost can backfire, particularly when the benefit from investment G is high in 
relation to typical investment costs.  Clearly, there always exists a high enough level of G 18 
for which the public could make itself better off it could credibly commit to never 
sanction incumbents, conditional on investment taking place. 
 
III.  Electoral Politics and Long-Term Investment 
 
In an influential paper, Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) demonstrated that ex ante 
uncertainty about the identities of the eventual "winners" and "losers" of a prospective 
economic reform can lead to non-adoption of the reform by majority vote, even when (i) 
all agents are risk-neutral and (ii) it is common knowledge that a pure majority would 
stand to benefit from the reform ex post.  The core intuition from their model is quite 
simple, and is easiest to illustrate through an example.  Suppose that a third of the agents 
in an economy stands to gain $6 per capita from a prospective reform, while each agent 
from the remaining two-thirds of the population stands to gain $3 with probability one-
half and lose $6 with probability one-half.  The reform therefore promises to bring a net 
gain in social welfare—namely, an increase in per capita wealth of (1/3)$6 + (1/3)$3 – 
(1/3)$6 = $1.  In addition, it is clear that a majority (two-thirds) will eventually benefit 
from the reform.  However, since agents who face uncertain gains from the reform (who 
also constitute two-thirds of the population) attach a negative expected value to the 
reform, or (1/2)$3 – (1/2)$6 = – $1.5, they will defeat the reform as a pure majority. 
Efficient outcomes could potentially be achieved in the Fernandez-Rodrik 
framework through the introduction of either one of two mechanisms.  The first would 
involve delegation of authority—namely, taking the investment decision out of the hands 
of the majority and instead placing it in the hands of a third party who internalizes its 19 
aggregate welfare implications.  It is clear, for example, that an autocrat who has the 
power to impose a tax rate of t > 0 would choose to adopt reform in the example above, 
as his expected gain from doing so would be exactly $t per capita.  In this sense, 
autocracy again provides a simple solution to efficiency concerns, even though it does so 
at the expense of allocative concerns. 
Efficient outcomes might alternatively be achieved with the aid of redistributive 
transfers—under the assumption that investment promises to bring a net gain in aggregate 
welfare, there always exists a rent sharing arrangement that promises to leave everyone in 
the economy better off.  Thus, if commitments could be made at the ex ante stage to 
institute the appropriate transfers from the gainers to the losers ex post, the public at large 
would itself internalize the aggregate welfare implications of the investment decision. 
In this section, we consider the manner in which electoral politics can pose 
obstacles to long-term investment even when (i) political elites do internalize the 
aggregate welfare implications of investment, and (ii) they also have the ability to make 
binding commitments to redistributive policy.  The central theme is that electoral politics 
can pose a threat to long-term investments which feature uncertainty that extends across 
election cycles.  More precisely, we consider investments that are sufficiently long term 
such that there exists an election after the investment is made but before the investment 
matures.  
We begin by considering investments of the type considered by Fernandez and 
Rodrik—namely, investments that are disliked by a majority ex ante even though they are 
anticipated to benefit a majority ex post—and we ask whether redistributive schemes that 
allow all constituents to share in the net gains from investment can be made politically 20 
feasible.  We show that in the presence of electoral politics, the answer may be no.  In our 
model of subsection A, it is precisely the ex post minority status of the losers, coupled 
with the fear among an ex ante majority that they will belong to this disenfranchised 
group in future rounds of electoral politics, that poses a barrier to investment.  The nature 
of electoral politics therefore undercuts the state's ability to resolve problems of 
coordination failure among the public at large.    
We then show that electoral politics can even thwart long-term investments that 
meet the approval of an ex ante majority.  In particular, we demonstrate that such 
investments may prove politically infeasible whenever politicians have the ability to 
divest prematurely in order to finance short-term spending programs that are 
economically inferior but free of uncertainty.  In our model of subsection B, the nature of 
electoral politics induces politicians to trade off long-term welfare considerations in order 
to offer guaranteed payouts to today's voters.  Moreover, we show that the public may 
choose collectively to tolerate this behavior even when all agents are risk-neutral.  
    
A.  Electoral Politics and Time-inconsistency of Redistribution Schemes: An Application 
to Trade Reform 
 
We now describe a simple story of electoral politics in the context of the types of 
investment opportunities considered by Fernandez and Rodrik.  We frame the discussion 
in the language of trade reform, but our interest extends to other sorts of long-term 
"investment" opportunities that require promises of ex post redistribution in order to 
become feasible ex ante.    21 
In this simple model, the confluence of uncertainty, majority rule, and political 
turnover create a situation in which protectionist policies are instituted due to a common 
fear among individuals who constitute a political majority ex ante that they will belong to 
an overlooked political minority ex post.  This inconsistency between the interests of the 
ex ante versus ex post political majorities poses a simple problem of time inconsistency 
for competing political parties hoping to resolve a prisoners' dilemma-type equilibrium. 
Consider the following two-period model.  The economy is composed of two 
distinct types of agents, capitalists and workers.  Let β denote the population share of 
workers, where we assume that β ≥ 0.5.  The economy is initially closed to trade.  In the 
absence of trade, all agents—capitalists and workers alike—have a per-period wealth 
endowment equal to w.  If the economy is instead opened to trade, capitalists can reinvest 
their endowments in order to earn wc > w, but workers face uncertain returns depending 
on whether or not they become displaced.  We assume that each individual worker is 
displaced with probability δ, and that a worker's payoff from open trade is given by 
 
wL   with probability δ 
wH   with probability 1 – δ, 
 
where wL  < w < wH .  We assume that δ < 0.5, so that a majority of workers stands to 
benefit from free trade.  Finally, we assume that, if the economy is opened to trade in the 
first period, workers displaced in the first period remain displaced going into the second 
period. 22 
  At the start of each period, two vote-maximizing parties compete with one 
another to secure the favor of a pure majority of agents.  In each election, each party runs 
on the basis of a policy vector {T, R}, where T denotes trade policy and R denotes 
redistribution policy.  For simplicity, we restrict our attention to discreet policy choices; 
we assume that T ∈ {open, protect}, and R ∈ {redistribute, don't redistribute}.  We make 
two additional restrictions on redistribution policy.  First, the policy choice redistribute is 
assumed to generate full equity across agents.  And second, due to the fact that the 
economy is initially closed (so that the initial wealth distribution is uniform across 
agents), redistribution policy only comes into play in period 2. 
  We restrict our attention to the parameter space defined by 
 
() () ( ) w w w w c H L         1 1 > − + − + β δ δ β   (7)
() .         1 w w w H L ≤ − + δ δ   (8)
 
In words, opening the economy to trade promises to bring net social gains (equation (7)).  
However, the costs of becoming a displaced worker are sufficiently high that, as a group, 
all workers are opposed to free trade (equation (8)).  Equations (7) and (8) therefore give 
us our first result, by construction: when individuals in the economy face different levels 
of uncertainty from free trade, a majority of individuals may oppose free trade even when 
a majority within that opposing majority stands to benefit from free trade—this is the 
Fernandez-Rodrik result. 
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  We assume that the party that wins the election in a given period can consume an 
exogenously determined share t of production in that period.  Therefore, both parties 
have an incentive to "maximize the size of the pie" by opening the economy to trade 
(equation 1).  But due to the assumption that the population share of workers α is greater 
than one-half, each party's dominant strategy is to choose protect in both period 1 and 
period 2, creating a prisoners' dilemma-style equilibrium (period 2 redistribution policy is 
irrelevant in this case, as we have assumed that income levels are identical across agents 
in the closed economy).   
  Suppose, however, that each party has the opportunity to sign a legally binding 
contract with the public at time 0 which commits that party to (i) campaign on the trade 
policy open in period 1, and (ii) campaign on the policy vector {open, redistribute} in 
period 2.  The signing of such a contract would appear to be mutually beneficial to both 
the contracting party as well as everyone in the economy: the contracting party would 
increase the economy's tax base relative to the status quo, while the public (both 
capitalists and workers) would give itself access to higher-than-status quo rents by voting 
for the contracting party in both periods.  So where lies the problem? 
  The catch is that workers in period 1 would be willing to vote for open in period 1 
if and only if redistribute was anticipated to be the policy instituted in period 2—and if 
they are rational, workers realize that this policy trajectory is time inconsistent.  At time 
1, looking forward, a majority of voters (namely, all workers) favor the policy 
redistribute in period 2 contingent on the policy open being chosen in period 1.  But 
those who still favor the policy redistribute by the time elections actually roll around in 24 
period 2 will have become a political minority, as workers who had feared becoming 
displaced ex ante but find that they have not been displaced ex post will no longer desire 
redistribution (recall that δ < 0.5, so that displaced workers constitute an ex post political 
minority regardless of β, the overall population share of workers).  As a result, any party 
campaigning on redistribute in period 2 is guaranteed of defeat, as is (by backwards 
induction) any party campaigning on open in period 1. 
  Note that the contractual arrangement described above between the public and a 
given party would be implementable if βδ  ≥ 0.5, even if all of the other parameter 
restrictions still held, since displaced workers would then constitute a political majority 
favoring redistribute in period 2.  Thus, somewhat ironically, it is precisely the fact that 
displaced workers are expected to constitute a political minority ex post that underpins 
the protectionist policy trajectory. 
  This model offers one possible explanation for why outright protectionism might 
emerge as the only politically feasible way of attracting the support of at-risk domestic 
workers.  In the model, reparations to displaced workers take place over the long term, or 
more precisely, after domestic gains from trade have started to materialize.  Political 
turnover necessitates that these reparations remain popular among a majority of voters if 
they are to be sustained, but the removal of uncertainty in the interim (associated with the 
identification of the actual winners and losers from trade) insures that this will not be the 
case.  It is the fear of misfortune among an ex ante majority, coupled with the anticipated 
minority status of the losers ex post, that drives the result.  25 
  Finally, it is obvious that protectionism would never arise in the absence of 
political competition, as an autocrat would choose to open the economy to trade in order 
to maximize his tax base, ignoring the popular repercussions of that decision. 
 
B.  Electoral Politics and Short-Term Bias 
 
  This very simple model formalizes the dual ideas that, in the presence of 
uncertainty about the eventual private returns to long-term public investments (i) the 
nature of electoral politics may induce competitive populism among both political 
incumbents and political challengers, and (ii) the public may choose collectively to 
tolerate this behavior even if agents are individually risk-neutral.  One of the key features 
that distinguishes this model from the one considered in section II is the new assumption 
that political challengers can make binding commitments to policy. 
Consider a 2-period economy with a population of agents normalized to mass one.  
There is an incumbent ruler in period one, who has complete control over an amount K of 
public capital.  Agents at large are ex ante identical.  Production only takes place over the 
course of period 2, where every agent's period 2 output is given by 
 
yi  =  ky   with probability α 
  =  0   with probability 1 – α,                                                       (9) 
 
where  y is a positive constant, and k  ≤  K denotes the amount of public investment 
undertaken by the incumbent ruler in period 1  Equation (9) can be interpreted to mean 26 
that the public investment is risky, and is expected to raise either everyone's productivity 
with probability α or no one's productivity with probability 1 – α; alternatively, equation 
(9) can be interpreted to mean that the public investment is expected to benefit only a 
partial share α of the population, where the identities of the beneficiaries are not known 
ex ante—either interpretation is fine for our purposes here.  Finally, suppose that the 





  Let us start by assuming that the incumbent ruler is retained with certainty into 
period 2.  The ruler seeks to maximize his undiscounted stream of income from office, 
namely 
 
() . ) ( ky t k K R α π + − =   (10)
 
The linearity of equation (10) leads us to corner solutions: the ruler chooses k = K if tαy 
≥ 1, and k = 0 otherwise.  In other words, provided that αy ≥ 1 (so that public investment 
is socially efficient), the ruler will make the socially efficient decision to invest if and 
only if he expects to command a sufficient share t of the returns.  Throughout the 
remaining discussion, let us restrict our attention to the more interesting situations in 
which this pair of conditions holds.  Under these conditions, the expected income of the 
representative agent is equal to 27 
 
() , ) 1 ( * Ky t i α π − =   (11)
 
and aggregate social welfare is equal simply to αKy. 
 
Electoral Promises from a Political Challenger 
 
  Let us now assume that there exists a potential political challenger who, by 
incurring a cost of c > 0, can force an election between himself and the incumbent at the 
end of period 1.  If the challenger chooses to engage the incumbent, a simple majority 
vote determines the winner of the election.  We can therefore think of the parameter c as 
an inverse measure of political competition, if political competition is interpreted to 
measure the ease of bringing about political turnover.  We assume that agents are risk-
neutral, and simply vote for the candidate that offers them the highest income level. 
  First, suppose that the incumbent continues to behave as he would in the absence 
of a potential challenger, and therefore chooses k = K.  Since (i) this is the socially 
optimal policy, and (ii) we have assumed that the tax rate is determined exogenously, the 
only way for the challenger to curry favor among the public is to (promise to) divest 
funds from the public investment in order finance transfers to selected groups—a practice 
we will call competitive populism.  Specifically, let us assume that the challenger, if 
elected, has the ability to terminate the public investment before it matures and thereby 
recoup the funds that the incumbent had previously invested.  In this case, the challenger 
can assure himself of electoral victory by promising guaranteed sums of infinitesimally 28 
higher than πi* (equation 11) to exactly half of all agents in the economy.  Note that since 
αy ≥ 1 (so that k* = K from the perspective of a social planner), this divestment is 
harmful to the economy as a whole, even though it meets the approval of a pure majority. 
  The feasibility of this tactic by the challenger hinges on two parameter conditions: 
 
1   ≥   0.5(1 – t)αy   (12)
     
and 
 
() .         ) 1 ( 5 . 0 1 c y t K ≥ − − α   (13)
 
Equation (12) says that, if the challenger is to engage in competitive populism, the 
expected per capita benefit of the existing long-term investment (net of taxes) must be no 
higher than twice the per capita dollar cost of the investment—in other words, the 
expected per capita returns of the investment must be less than or equal to 200 percent.  
This is intuitive, as the challenger must (through divestment) acquire sufficient funds to 
finance transfers to exactly half of the population, while making that half of the 
population as least as well off as it would expect to be if the public investment was 
allowed to mature.  
Note that the challenger's incentives to seek office are born entirely out of his 
opportunity to become the residual claimant on divested public funds (once the votes 
have been paid for), and are independent of the tax rate on matured public investments.  
Equation (13) simply says that this prospective short-term windfall must be larger than 29 
the challenger's cost of entry c.  In this sense, competitive populism is sustained by the 
short-term incentives of the public and politicians alike—for the public, the sure promise 
of short-term gains trumps the uncertain promise of collectively larger long-term gains, 
while for politicians, competitive populism presents a vehicle for trading off long term 
revenue opportunities for guarantees of popular support today.         
  Now let us consider the incumbent ruler's optimal response to this anticipated 
challenge.  To begin, we need to specify whether the incumbent ruler's property rights 
over noninvested public funds are secure.  Let us suppose that they are not, so that the 
challenger can access the entirety of K if he assumes office, regardless of how the 
incumbent has chosen to allocate K (otherwise, we would need to contend with the 
incumbent's incentives to "grab everything today," which are not germane to the 
mechanism we wish to highlight here).  In this case, the incumbent's only viable option is 
to preemptively offer 2(K – c) in upfront transfers to half of the population—at a total 
cost of (K – c)—and to devote just the remaining c units of capital to public investment 
(recall that, since we have assumed that tαy ≥ 1, the incumbent prefers to devote the 
leftover funds to public investment rather appropriate them outright).   As can be easily 
verified, this strategy acts to "price the challenger out of the market" at the margin, and 
thus to secure the incumbent's tenancy.  However, achieving this job security comes at a 
significant social cost: in the new equilibrium, social welfare is equal to  
 
SW   =   (K – c) + αyc.  (14)
  30 
Comparing this figure to the previously derived social welfare level of αγG under stable 
autocracy, it can be easily verified that the threat of political turnover (and the 
competitive populism induced by it) anticipates a loss in social welfare equal to  
 
SW LOSS   =   (αy – 1)(K – c).  (15)
 
We see that the social welfare cost of competitive populism is larger when c is lower (i.e., 
when political competition is more intense based on the political turnover interpretation 
of political competition), when the opportunity cost of engaging in competitive populism 
is higher (i.e., when the social returns to public investment, αy, are larger), and when the 
state initially has more resources K at its disposal (i.e., when there is more to be 
potentially lost, in absolute terms, from misguided public investments).        
 
IV.  Concluding Comments 
 
In summary, political competition can introduce varied tradeoffs of economic 
costs and benefits.  Our discussion in sections II and III focused more heavily on certain 
of its costs (which may lie closer to the peripheries of public perception) than on its more 
easily imagined benefits.  We focused in particular on the role of political competition, 
both in the sense of accountability for incumbents and electoral politics, in defining the 
set of politically feasible public investments.  Two themes emerged from our discussion.  
First, when information asymmetry about investment costs prevents the public from 
discerning productive from wasteful public spending, the public may be ill-served by its 31 
ability to sanction incumbents at a low cost.  Second, long-term investment opportunities 
may waste away under the shadow of electoral politics, even when competing elites 
would each appear to have both the incentive and the means to nurture such investments 
to maturity. 
At a minimum, we hope to have provided a cautionary tale against simple 
generalizations about the economic consequences of political competition.  We have 
demonstrated that an array of diverse factors—such as information asymmetry between 
the public and the state, distributional conflicts among the public at large, and the 
characteristics of public investment opportunities—can play a role in mapping political 
competition onto economic outcomes. 
We now turn to a few of the issues that we ignored in our analysis.  Our model of 
accountability for incumbents in section II treated the public as a representative agent, 
and in the process, ignored issues relating to heterogeneity and distributional conflicts 
among agents at large.  In the presence of heterogeneous preferences over public 
investment, for example, incumbents would need to choose not just whether or not to 
engage in investment, but also which types of investments to pursue.  Moreover, it is 
realistic to assume that agents in the real world differ not only with regard to their 
preferences over public investment, but also in their abilities to sanction incumbents 
effectively.  It has been argued, for example, that the wide discrepancies that we observe 
in levels of patronage across special interest groups can be partly attributed to the fact 
that certain groups are better than others at coordinating the votes of their members in 
response to policy.
8            
                                                 
8 See Persson and Tabellini (2000), and chapters 7 and 8 in particular. 32 
  Although we considered distributional conflicts among the public at large in our 
models of electoral politics in section III, we treated political parties as if they were 
solitary agents.  In the process, we ignored issues of conflict and coordination among 
heterogeneous factions within a party, which play a central role in the models of party 
competition proposed by Roemer (2001).  Our discussion of electoral politics in section 
III also ignored the possibility of collusion between parties or political elites.  It would be 
easy to extend our simple two-period models to an infinitely-repeated game setting in 
order to consider the sustainability of collusive norms based on trigger strategies.   
  We also ruled out the possibility of heterogeneity across politicians in both 
sections II and III; although we allowed politicians to differ in their policy platforms in 
section III, we continued to assume that they were ex ante identical.  While the 
assumption of ex ante homogeneity among aspiring potential leaders is common in 
existing models of political competition
9, future theoretical research may do well to 
consider the implications of relaxing this assumption.  For example, it might be 
interesting to expand the simple model that we presented in section II in order to account 
for the existence of "skilled" versus "unskilled" politicians, so that the cost of public 
investment would reflect the sum of a stochastic cost component selected by nature, and a 
politician-specific cost component dictated by his "type."  
  Finally, we did not address a potential benefit that we see arising from 
competition between political elites: namely, what might be termed increased awareness 
of the common people.  To the extent that intensified competition provides political elites 
with stronger incentives to mobilize public support, it may also lead them in some 
                                                 
9 The model of political yardstick competition by Besley and Case (1995) is a counterexample. 33 
instances to establish strategic alliances with otherwise overlooked segments of the 
population.  We think, for example, that the extension of franchise to the working class in 
nineteenth-century Europe may be partly understood on these grounds.  
  We conclude with an appeal for empirical research on this topic.  While 
theoretical research can help us to identify some of the tradeoffs of economic costs and 
benefits associated with political competition, empirical research is needed to assess the 
implications of these tradeoffs.  Problems of endogeneity do pose an especially 
formidable obstacle in this vein.  Still, recent empirical work has made significant 
advances in identifying exogenous sources of variation across political institutions, and it 
seems well within our capability to frame empirically tractable questions about political 
competition.  Our model of protectionism in section III might suggest, for example, that 
trade liberalization is more likely to prove politically feasible when trade policy and 
redistributive policy are controlled by officials who face longer periods of time between 
elections—a testable prediction.  Such empirical assessments will do much to inform our 
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